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Abstract
This paper provides an analysis of the social consequences of people seek-
ing to keep up with the Joneses. All individuals attempt to reach a higher
rank than the Joneses, including the Joneses themselves. This attitude gives
rise to an equilibrium in which all individuals have equal utilities but unequal
(gross) incomes. Due to a rat-race effect, individuals devote too much energy
to climbing the social scale in this equilibrium. However, laissez-faire equilib-
rium is an equal-utility constrained social optimum. Unexpectedly, numerical
simulations show that this theory could account for the observed distribution
of intermediate wages.
Key words : Keeping up with the Joneses, Social interactions, Well-being, Inequali-
ties, Efficiency.
JEL Classification numbers: D3, D6, D8, I3, Z1.
∗Corresponding Author, CREM and TEPP, CNRS and Normandy University, Caen, Faculty
of Economics and Management, 19 rue Claude Bloch, BP 5186, 14032 Caen Cedex, France; fred-
eric.gavrel@unicaen.fr
†LIRSA-CNAM and IZA, Department of Economics, 40 rue des Jeuˆneurs, Case 1D2P30, 75002
Paris, France; therese.rebiere@cnam.fr
1
1 Introduction
”So far as concerns the present question, the end
sought by accumulation is to rank high in compari-
son with the rest of the community in point of pe-
cuniary strength.” - Veblen (1899)
In this paper, inspired by Veblen (1899), we provide an analysis of the social conse-
quences of people seeking to Keep Up with the Joneses, KUJ henceforth. In accor-
dance with Veblen (1899)1, individuals’ utilities not only depend on their incomes
but also on their social “status”. All people attempt to reach a higher social status
than the Joneses, including the Joneses themselves. Here KUJ means doing as well
and even better than ones’ social ”neighbors”.
The idea that the individual well-being is to some extent relative to that of others
and that we all try to keep up with wealthier than us dates back to Smith (1776) who
noticed that happiness is not linked to the stock of acquisitions but to the progressive
state of acquiring (see Book I, chapter VIII: of the wages of Labour, paragraph 42).
Smith also pointed out that prosperity makes the poorest incapable of being content
with the consumption which had formerly satisfied them (see Book I, chapter VIII: of
the wages of Labour, paragraph 34). Duesenberry (1949) was the first to empirically
observe this relative income phenomenon. The well-know Easterlin paradox (Easterlin
1974) tells us that while the progressive state of income acquisition is correlated
with happiness, increased income does not lead itself to increased happiness. As a
consequence of this transitory effect of income on life satisfaction, which acts like a
focusing illusion (Kahneman et al. 2006), the Keeping-Up-with-the-Joneses behavior
leads to a rat-race in which the individual’s goal is to place her or himself higher in the
(gross) income hierarchy. Another aspect of KUJ behavior is conformism. As noted
by Leibenstein (1976) and Granovetter and Soong (1986), status-seeking people are
incited to acquire trendy goods in order to conform with those people they compare
themselves with. Reversely, the status rat-race also leads to avoiding the consumption
1See Arrow (1975) for a view of Veblen as an economic theorist.
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of overly popular products. In words, individuals express consumption (and wealth)
concerns relative to that of their peers (see for instance Ghiglino and Goyal 2010 and
Xiaodong et al. 2014).
Our model can be compared with James Mirrlees’ path-breaking paper. Contrary to
Mirrlees (1971), individuals are identical ex ante. But, since they wish to become
VIP’s, they turnout to be heterogenous ex post with VIP’s consuming a great deal of
energy to keep their envied social position, common people having a low status but
not consuming as much energy in pursuing that end. This gives rise to an equilibrium
in which all individuals have equal utilities but unequal (gross) incomes. We derive
other interesting insights in this essay. First, we show that there is a single social
optimum, relative to which all effort is lower than in the case of laissez-faire. This
is the consequence of individuals devoting their energy to climbing the social scale.
Next, this social optimum generates true inequalities, that is, inequalities in terms of
utilities. The reason for this is that a social planner takes advantage of the dispersion
of individuals on the ranking scale. Finally, we find that KUJ equilibrium is a true-
equality constrained social optimum. It follows that if “you” dislike true inequalities,
that is inequalities in term of utility, then “you” should favor observed (gross) income
inequalities, and “you” should firmly reject the idea of any redistributive tax policy.
We also give an assessment of the empirical potential of KUJ theory. Unexpectedly,
the simulated income distribution rather correctly replicates the observed distribution
of wages in France, within an extensive ”middle class”.
The jealousy hypothesis is indirectly confirmed in the empirical investigations by
Easterlin, who finds that “growth does not buy happiness”. This unfortunate outcome
can be interpreted as a consequence of KUJ attitude. If all incomes increase by
the same rate, income hierarchy is not affected. Consequently, individuals do not
perceive any improvement (in their social status). In that regard, we would like to
stress that the analytical tool that we construct in the following assumes rational
expectations in the sense that individuals’ decisions generate the income distribution
on which they base their calculations. Although rational expectations became a nec
plus ultra in economic theory about forty years ago, it seems that myopic or adaptative
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expectations a` la Milton Friedman might better account for observed facts in the so-
called empirical economics of Happiness2. Indeed, myopic individuals would realize
ex post that, despite their efforts, they did not succeed in reaching a higher status
since everyone else did too. In other words, while the Smithes were attempting to
keep up with the Joneses, the Joneses themselves moved towards the Harpers who,
in turn, moved towards the Rebieres... As a result, the Smithes, Joneses, Harpers
and Rebieres, and everybody else report that their happiness is either equal or even
falling when asked by Happiness economists.
Section 2 builds our modeling of KUJ equilibrium. The welfare implications of
keeping-up-with-the-Joneses are studied in section 3 while section 4 examines the
empirical potential of KUJ hypothesis. The conclusion summarizes our findings and
sets a non-exhaustive agenda for further investigations.
2 Environment and KUJ equilibrium
Let us consider an environment a` la James Mirrlees. Following this author, individ-
uals’ income, y, is an increasing function of their effort, k. But, contrary to Mirrlees
(1971), all individuals have the same efficiency at work, implying that they are per-
fectly identical ex ante. In other words, there is a single technology y = H(k), with
H(k) being an increasing (strictly) concave function which satisfies H(0) > 03. The
set of individuals is a continuum whose measure is normalized to 1.
Individuals’ investments generate an endogenous c.d.f., Π(k), which represents the
proportion of individuals whose investments are strictly lower than k, i.e. Π(k) =
Prob[Effort < k]. This definition of Π(.) makes the exposition easier. A priori this
function is assumed to be piecewise continuous. Its mass points are denoted by
(K1 < ... < Ki < ... < Kn) where the positive integer n can be unbounded. The
corresponding frequencies are (φ(K1), ..., φ(Kn)). If n is zero, Π(.) is continuous on
2KUJ has been broadly empirically tested trough well-being sample surveys and experiments
since the 90s. See for instance Clark and Oswald (1996), or more recently Card et al. (2012).
3This (reasonable) assumption makes the analysis simpler.
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[0,∞[.
These people are jealous. They are all willing to keep up with the Joneses, implying
that they are affected by their location on Lorenz curve. In this context, the utility
of an individual, U(k, .), is decreasing in her effort, while increasing in her rank in
income hierarchy as well as in her output. We retain the following form
U(k, .) = −k + J(Π(k))H(k) (1)
In the previous expression, the term J(.), referred to as the “KUJ multiplier”, is a
strictly increasing (continuous) function of the share, Π(k), of strictly lower ranked
participants.4 It is worth noting that, according to our definition, Π(k) = Π(k−).
Thus, if Ki is a mass point, Π(K
+
i ) = Π(Ki) + Φ(Ki). With no loss in generality, the
top, J(1), can be set to 1 while the bottom, J(0), assumed to be strictly positive, is
denoted by µ (0 < µ < 1).
This specification of utility U(.) nicely captures the ambition of keeping up with the
Joneses. It is not purely additive, implying that the downgrading (or upgrading)
effect is all the higher as individuals are rich. This is in conformity with Thorstein
Veblen’s message (1899).
Each individual maximizes U(k) with respect to her effort k for a given c.d.f. Π(k).
It is also assumed that function V (k) = −k + H(k) goes to −∞ as k goes to +∞
and that the derivative of V (k) is strictly positive for k = 0. This implies that V (.)
has a single maximum k˜ > 0 with V (k˜) = V˜ . On the other hand, W (k) denotes
−k + µH(k)
In this environment an equilibrium can be defined as below.
Definition 1 A KUJ equilibrium is a distribution function Π∗(.) such that, for all k
in its support, U(k) is maximized with respect to k ≥ 0.
It can be noted that this definition implies that U(k) is a constant U∗ ≥ U(0) > 0,
4Results extend to the case in which the multiplier associated with a mass point Ki is higher
than J(Π(Ki)) but lower than J(Π(Ki) + Φ(Ki)).
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for all k in the support of an equilibrium distribution. Let us study this equilibrium.
In Appendix A, it is proved that the equilibrium distribution is continuous and that
its support, denoted by S∗, is a bounded interval [A,B] with 0 ≤ A < B < ∞. For
simplicity, the analysis focus on the case in which the lower bound, A, is strictly
positive. In S∗, U(k) is a constant U∗ > 0. Consider the behavior of the KUJ
multiplier J(k) = J(Π(k)) in the interval [A,B]. We have J(A) = µ. In the interval
[A,B], J(k) is strictly increasing and equal to one for k = B. In this interval, J(k)
satisfies (see equation (1))
J(k) =
k + U∗
H(k)
(2)
So J(k) has a derivative J ′(k) such that
J ′(k) =
H(k)− (k + U∗)H ′(k)
H(k)2
One can check that if J ′(A) ≥ 0, then J ′(k) > 0 in ]A,B]. As U(A) should be
equal to U∗, it follows that J ′(A)H(A) = 1 − µH ′(A) ≥ 0. Consider the behavior
of U(k) in [0, A[. In this interval, U(k) = W (k) should be lower than U(A). The
concavity of H(.) then imposes that −1 + µH ′(A) ≥ 0. See Figure 1. It results
that −1 + µH ′(A) = 0. Consequently, S∗ is an interval [A,B] whose lower bound is
determined by −1 + µH ′(A) = 0. The latter equation has a solution A∗(> 0) if and
only if −1 + µH ′(0) > 0. From A∗, we deduce U∗ = U(A∗).
Let us now turn to the upper bound. Since Π∗(B) = 1, B∗ satisfies −B + H(B) =
U(A∗). For k > B∗, U(k) = V (k) = −k + H(k). This implies that B∗ ≥ k˜. If not,
U(k) = V (k) would be strictly increasing for B∗ < k < k˜. Consequently, B∗ is the
highest solution to −B +H(B) = U(A∗). See Figure 1.
Results are summarized in the proposition below.
Proposition 1 If and only if −1 + µH ′(0) > 0, the support of Π∗(.) is an interval
[A∗, B∗] with 0 < A∗ < B∗. A∗ is the solution to −1 + µH ′(A) = 0 while B∗ is the
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highest solution to −B + H(B) = U∗ = U(A∗). In this interval, KUJ equilibrium
satisfies Π∗(k) = J−1((k + U∗)/H(k)).5
In fact, the derivation of a KUJ equilibrium is simple. The investment of individuals
at the bottom of hierarchy does not depend on investment distribution. And the
same holds for individuals at the top. Between the two extremes, Π∗(k) is set so as
to ensure that utilities are constant and equal to U(A∗). From Π∗(k) = 1, hence,
J(k) = 1, one deduces the upper bound of the support (which should be greater than
the lower bound).
Figure 1 illustrates the determination of an equilibrium. As W (k) is maximized in A∗,
U(k) coincides with W (k) for 0 ≤ k ≤ A∗, is equal to U∗ (= U(A∗)), for A∗ ≤ k ≤ B∗,
and coincides with V (k), beyond B∗.
Figure 1: KUJ Equilibrium, W ′(0) > 0.
-
6
k
U∗
V˜
A∗ B∗k˜
V (.)W (.)
5One can see that if −1 + µH ′(0) ≤ 0, then S∗ is an interval [0, B∗], with B∗ being the highest
solution to −B +H(B) = µH(0).
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Individuals are identical ex ante. But, since they wish to become VIP’s, they turn
out to be heterogenous ex post, with VIP’s consuming a great deal of energy to keep
their envied social position, common people having a low status but not consuming
as much energy to pursuing that end. This gives rise to an equilibrium in which all
individuals have equal utilities, but unequal (gross) incomes. Income inequality is not
very surprising. Indeed, starting from a situation of income equality, a (very) small
increase in effort is sufficient to reach the top of the social hierarchy, implying that
such a symmetric outcome cannot be an equilibrium. On the other hand, one could
predict that all individuals will be prompted to “do the maximum”. This is what
can occur when beyond some ceiling, the marginal return to effort is reduced to zero.
It can be noted that equilibrium existence is ensured for all strictly increasing KUJ
multiplier, J(Π(k)). Numerical simulations given in section 4 throw some light on
the comparative statics.
3 Welfare analysis
The welfare criterion is the weighted average of utilities. Let S(Π(.)) denote the
support of Π(.). Aggregate welfare is
Σ(Π(.)) = −
∫
S(Π(.))
kdΠ(k) +
∫
S(Π(.))
J(Π(k))H(k)dΠ(k)
We can state that an equilibrium is inefficient: all participants invest too much.
In what sense? To answer this question, we rank the individuals uniformly (and
continuously) on the segment [0, 1]. As the ranking is uniform, there is a share r of
individuals whose ranks are lower than r (i.e. whose ranks lie in the interval [0, r]).
In market equilibrium Π∗(.), the effort of r-workers satisfies r = Π∗(k) or k = k∗(r),
with k∗(.) being the reciprocal of Π∗(.). As KUJ equilibrium is continuous, we have
Σ(k∗(.)) =
∫ 1
0
[−k∗(r) + J(r)H(k∗(r))] dr =
∫ B∗
A∗
[−k + J(Π∗(k))H(k)] dΠ∗(k)
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Making use of this ranking of individuals, let us study the effect of a small change
dK in all efforts in the neighborhood of equilibrium. Since all investments vary
by the same amount, the rank (r) associated with (k∗(r) + dK) is left unchanged.
Consequently, the change in aggregate welfare is
dΣ =
∫ 1
0
[
−1 + J(r)dH(k
∗(r))
dk(r)
]
dKdr
On the other hand, in KUJ equilibrium, all individuals have the same utility U∗,
implying that
−1 + J(r)dH(k
∗(r))
dk(r)
= −dJ(Π
∗(k∗(r)))
dk(r)
H(k∗(r)) < 0
.
We then obtain
dΣ
dK
= −
∫ 1
0
dJ(Π∗(k∗(r)))
dk(r)
H(k∗(r))dr < 0
This proves that
Proposition 2 In the neighborhood of KUJ equilibrium, lowering individuals’ efforts
improves welfare.
This result clearly comes from KUJ attitude. From Proposition 2, one can easily
deduce that introducing a small income tax would improve welfare. Proposition 2
fails to locate KUJ equilibrium relative to social optimum. Making use of the ranking
model of effort dispersion, [k(r)]10, we can prove the following
Proposition 3 (i) Assuming that −1 + µH ′(0) > 0, KUJ model has a single social
optimum, [kS(r)]10, such that −1 + J(r)(dH(k(r))/dk(r)) = 0 for all r in [0, 1]. (ii)
k∗(r) > kS(r) for all r in [0, 1].
From the ranking optimum kS(r), we deduce the optimum distribution ΠS(k) which
is the reciprocal of kS(r).
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Statement (i) results from the fact that the two models of effort dispersion, either
the distribution Π(k), or the ranking function k(r), are isomorphic. See Appendix B.
In words, deciding on a non-decreasing function k(r) is not different from deciding
on a distribution function Π(k).6 So the proof of statement (i) amounts to observing
that, due to the concavity of H(.), kS(r) is strictly increasing in r. At first glance
this result might look counter-intuitive, however. Indeed, one could object that, if
defined with a c.d.f. Π(k), a social optimum might have mass points. This can be
excluded. The reason is that any mass point Ki of Π(k) corresponds to a subinterval
of [0, 1] in which k(r) is constant and equal to Ki. Consequently, any mass point
generates a constraint on [k(r)]10. Since J(r) is strictly increasing, such constraints
would be binding for the social problem. Symmetrically, one can easily exclude the
case in which the social optimum defined as a distribution ΠS(k) would be constant in
a subinterval of [AS = kS(0), BS = kS(1)]. This is because the ranking of individuals
on [0, 1] would create a discontinuity of kS(r) in such a case. Hence, the social
optimum, ΠS(k), which is unique, is also continuous and strictly increasing in the
interval [AS, BS]. See Appendix B and C.
Statement (ii) results from the strict concavity of k(r) + J(r)H(k(r)) (in k(r)). In
words, this result means that, relative to the social optimum, laissez-faire gener-
ates too much investment. In a precise sense, that is, for all r in [0, 1]. As state-
ment (i) makes clear, this comes from the ranking effect, measured by the term
dJ(Π(k)/dk)H(k). In KUJ language, this result is the consequence of individuals
devoting their energy k to climb up the social scale, aiming at having more people
below them, or, equivalently, fewer people above them. This generates a rat-race
effect which makes individuals’ efforts excessive. On the contrary, a social planner
would decide on investments [k(r)]10 for a given ranking of individuals.
One implication of statement (i) is interesting per se. It turns out that, in the so-
6If X is a random variable whose c.d.f. F(.) is continuous and strictly increasing, then the random
variable Y = F(X) is uniformly distributed on (0,1). The proof of Proposition 3 just generalizes this
property to a piecewise continuous non-decreasing function F(.), then allowing for mass points.
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cial optimum, the utility U(r) = U(kS(r)) (whose derivative reduces to U ′(r) =
J ′(r)H(kS(r)) > 0 ) is strictly increasing. By this path, we have thus reached the
result that, in this context, although individuals are homogenous ex ante, utility in-
equality is better for welfare. This is an unexpected outcome, since a priori, one could
surmise that, due to the concavity of H(.), the social optimum should be symmetric.
As the ranking model makes clear, a social planner takes advantage of the dispersion
of individuals across the ranking scale. The reason is that the marginal product of ef-
fort grows with the individuals’ position in the hierarchy. In other words, rich people
profit more from an increase in their (gross of effort) revenue. Or, equivalently, people
are increasingly sensitive to social degrees when their income is higher. Consequently,
aggregate welfare is higher with a hierarchy of individuals.
It is worth noticing that Proposition 3 dramatically depends on the definition of
aggregate welfare. A (virtual) situation in which true (i.e. utility) inequality would
be favored because “rich people should be very rich” is a bit shocking. Extending the
analysis to other welfare criteria is an interesting line for further investigations. At
this stage, we can ask the following question. Which income distribution would an
egalitarian planner select? We can prove that
Proposition 4. KUJ equilibrium is an equal-utility constrained social optimum
The analysis can be restricted to a continuous distribution whose support is con-
nected.7 In this case, the proof of Proposition 4 consists in observing that the equal-
utility constraint U ′(r) = 0 implies that, for all r in [0, 1],
−k′(r) + J(r)H ′(k(r))k′(r) + J ′(r)H(k(r)) = 0
or,
−1 + J(k(r))H ′(k(r)) + dJ(Π(k(r)))
dk(r)
H(k(r)) = 0
7Mass points of probability (strictly) lower than one are clearly incompatible with the equal-
utility constraint. The same holds for holes in the support which are mapped into a discontinuity
of k(r) (see Appendix B). Conversely, one can see that the equal-income social optimum is another
equal-utility constrained social optimum.
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The latter condition is satisfied by KUJ equilibrium Π∗(k). It follows that this
(strictly) egalitarian social planner only has a single degree of freedom which is used
to make U(0) = −k(0) + µH(k(0)) as high as possible. This maximum is reached for
k(0) = A∗. Since k(r) cannot be decreasing, it results that k(1) = B∗.8 This shows
that KUJ equilibrium is an equal-utility constrained social optimum.
The implications of Proposition 4 can be expressed in the following maxima: Whoever
dislikes true inequalities, that is inequalities in terms of utility, should like observed
(gross) income inequalities, and should then fight against any redistributive tax policy.
4 Empirical potential and predictions of KUJ the-
ory
”Ah! Now my love we will show that Jones woman
that her husband is not the only Adonis that can
wear pink socks and a fuzzy hat!” - Pop (1913)9
In this section, we carry out numerical simulations aimed at throwing some light on
different issues. Can KUJ equilibrium replicate observed wage dispersion? How does
a change in KUJ attitude affect income dispersion?
The KUJ multiplier is specified as follows
J(Π(k)) = exp (−λ(1− Π(k)))
In the previous expression for the KUJ multiplier, the positive parameter λ can
be regarded as a measure of individuals’ KUJ propensity, also referred to as their
“social ambition”. The higher this parameter, the higher the effect of social rank
on individuals’ utilities. From section 2 (Proposition 1), we know that the bottom
8Notice that the derivative dJ(Π(k(r)))/dk(r) is equal to zero for r = 0 but J ′(r) > 0. This is
because, for r = 0, dJ(Π(k(r)))/dk(r) is zero but, since r = Π(k(r)), (dΠ(k(r))/dk(r))k′(r) = 1 for
all r in [0, 1].
9Arthur R. ”Pop” Momand, cartoonist, is the author of the ”Keeping up with the Jone-
ses”, a comic strip begun in 1913 and distributed by Associated Newspapers. The strip ran
in American newspapers for 26 years. This sentence comes from the first week of publica-
tions. See The Stripper’s Guide for information. http://strippersguide.blogspot.fr/2011/
02/pop-momand-profiled-by-alex-jay.html
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and the top of (gross) income distribution are respectively determined by H(A∗) with
−1 + exp (−λ)H ′(A∗) = 0, and by H(B∗) with B∗ being the highest solution to
U(B) = U∗, or −B +H(B) = −A∗ + exp (−λ)H(A∗).
We also know that the equilibrium value of the KUJ multiplier J∗(k) is deduced from
J∗(k) =
k − A∗ + exp (−λ)H(A∗)
H(k)
The specification of the multiplier is equivalent to
Π(k) = 1 +
ln J(k)
λ
It follows that
Π∗(k) = 1 +
1
λ
ln
[
k − A∗ + exp (−λ)H(A∗)
H(k)
]
Finally, the cumulative distribution of (gross) income y, denoted by G∗(y), derives
from Prob[Income < y] = Prob[Effort < H−1(y)], that is G∗(y) = Π∗(H−1(y)), or
G∗(y) = 1 +
1
λ
ln
[
H−1(y)− A∗ + exp (−λ)H(A∗)
y
]
with y lying on the range [H(A∗), H(B∗)].
In the following calculations, the production function, H(.) is specified as H(k) =
a + bkα with a, b, and α being three strictly positive parameters such that α < 1.
Notice that H ′(0) = ∞, implying that A∗ > 0, as in KUJ equilibrium (W ′(0) > 0).
KUJ propensity, λ, is strictly positive.
Figure 2 reports the actual distribution of wages in France in 2010. It can be noted
that the lower tail of the distribution is quite flat. In addition, individuals showing
similar behavior should belong to the same ”community”. For this reason, we limit
our study on the one hand to the poverty threshold, that is to say to 60% of the
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median income10, and on the other hand to the 95th percentile so that monthly gross
incomes vary between 1 317 and 5 586 euros. Thus, in accordance with The Theory
of Leisure Class, which here extends to a large “middle class”, the actual truncated
wage distribution is rather better replicated by the simulated distribution. The two
curves are presented on Figure 3.
The following numerical exercises give an assessment of the predictions of KUJ theory.
Notice that in next figures, all distribution functions (including the observed one)
have the same normalized support [0, 1]11 Figure 4 shows the simulated distribution
for different values of KUJ propensity, λ. KUJ attitude gives rise to inequalities.
The intuition behind this is simple. Individuals are homogenous, implying that,
in the absence of “social ambition” (λ = 0), they all earn the same income. In
the presence of social ambition, equality becomes impossible, as explained in the
comment on Proposition 1. Notice that beyond some threshold, an increase in KUJ
parameter would tend to lower income inequalities. This is because all efforts go to
zero as parameter λ goes to infinity. Besides, one can show that an increase in KUJ
propensity lowers individuals’ utilities12 but, in terms of (gross) incomes, the effect
on “perceived” wealth (or poverty) is ambiguous.
Another interesting issue is the way in which economic development affects income
inequalities and wealth. This can be appraised through an increase of parameter b
which can be seen as reflecting technological progress. Figure 5 depicts the effect of
such improvement of labor efficiency. Similar to KUJ ambition, above some limit, an
increase of labor efficiency would tend to reduce income dispersion. The reason for this
non-monotonicity is that individuals’ incomes are close to parameter a(= H(0)) as
parameter b goes to zero. In other words, individuals cannot differentiate when labor
efficiency is very low. On the other hand, in conformity with intuition, it can shown
that economic development increases perceived wealth. An increase of labor efficiency,
10This amounts to dropping about 10% of the bottom of the distribution.
11In other words, a c.d.f. G(y) of support [z, Z] is mapped into a c.d.f. Γ(x) = G(z + (Z − z)x)
of support [0, 1].
12Knowing that all individuals have the same utility in KUJ equilibrium, the proof amounts to see
that an increase in social ambition (parameter λ) reduces the utility U∗ = U(A∗) = −A∗+J(0)H(A∗
of individuals at the lower end of the social scale. KUJ multiplier J(0) = exp (−λ) falls.
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b, leads to a cumulative distribution which is stochastically dominant.13 Expressed
in words, the gross income associated with any social rank increases, implying that
the social rank, G(y), associated with any income level, y, decreases. One can see
that utilities also benefit from this technological change. It can be noted that these
comparative statics exercises have very different meanings. In the second case, wealth
is affected by a “material” phenomenon whereas, in the first case, the change in
utilities and incomes results from a sociological phenomenon. This highlights the role
of social values (like social ambition) in the economic sphere as well as the practical
importance that value-oriented policies may have in the real world. Contrary to K.
Marx but in accordance with J.M. Keynes, “ideas” may have economic consequences.
They may exert an influence on the so-called economic “infra-structures”. This is a
domain where “free lunches” could be found, although a marxian economist would
probably object that KUJ behavior, like individualism, is determined by the economic
environment.
To sum up, these first simulations, based on arbitrary parameters values, permit us
predict that the KUJ model does have empirical potential. We acknowledge that,
to some extent, KUJ theory is difficult to refute, since the plausibility of parameters
values cannot be easily assessed. A natural way of circumventing this problem would
be to assume that, excepting KUJ intensity λ, other parameters are common to
different countries. In that regard, notice also that the inference method to apply
in the estimation of inequalities is not obvious. One could argue that the distance
between observations and estimations should be linked to a measure of inequalities.
13See Appendix D. Notice that in this analysis, the support of the distribution is not normalized
to (0, 1).
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Figure 2: Income distribution for France, full distribution
Figure 3: Actual and simulated income distribution for France
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Figure 4: Simulated income distribution sensitivity to KUJ
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Figure 5: Simulated income distribution sensitivity to parameter b
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5 Concluding remarks
Perhaps, the main insight of this essay may be that income inequality can result from
the desire for (advantageous) inequality. This insight call into question the precise
meaning of studies showing that income inequalities “explain” life expectancy, mental
health, toxicomania, obesity...14 It cannot be ruled out that all these social issues,
including income inequalities, are driven by one common cause: the KUJ attitude. We
also showed that the KUJ hypothesis would have an empirical potential in replicating
the observed wage dispersion.
In this conclusion we would like to note that our KUJ model could be helpful in
many other contexts where, whatever its form may be, a rat-race prevails, as, for
instance, informative advertising15 with endogenously differentiated goods, or in the
population density of cities where workers’ on-the-job performance increases with
their proximity to firms. Indeed, the proximity to a place of work can be regarded as
a means of dealing with shocks, as with human capital in the Schultz/Nelson-Phelps
view.16 Our analysis of KUJ raises different issues. As noted in the introduction,
building a dynamic model with adaptative expectations would make the analysis
more expressive. Besides, what is going on when the Lorenz curve is not known for
anyone? Why are tax returns public in some countries - like Norway where daily local
newspapers report your neighbors’ incomes - whereas they are secret in many others?
And, still assuming imperfect information, what are the social consequences of the
poor mimicking rich, or hiding their poverty, and of the rich seeking to demonstrate to
the poor that they are rich. Which goods are produced to help rich in their ostentation
strategy? In France, Hermes offers a handbag which it advertises as reserved to
women with the necessary age and elegance. Introducing imperfect information would
allow for conspicuous consumption in the sense of Thorstein Veblen.17 Symmetrically,
14See Wilkinson and Pickett (2010). Whatever their interpretation may be, the empirical results
given by the authors are puzzling.
15Butters (1977) and Grossman and Shapiro (1984) are seminal papers.
16See Acemoglu and Autor (2012).
17Granovetter and Soong (1986) study market equilibrium in the presence of “reverse bandwagons”
effects.
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which goods do poor people use in their (paltry) attempt at cheating. We leave these
different questions for further investigation. We also assign to a companion paper the
task of appraising the extent to which international disparities in income inequalities
can be imputed to cultural specificities of KUJ social rules.
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Appendix
A. Equilibrium distribution Π∗(.)
This appendix shows that Π∗(.) is continuous and that its support is connected and
bounded above.
In a preliminary step, we show that Π∗(.) is continuous for k ≥ 0. Suppose it is not.
This means that Π∗(.) has at least one mass point Ki ≥ 0 of probability φ(Ki) > 0.
Suppose that a participant, D, who invests Ki initially, deviates and decide on a
higher investment Ki + . Since Π(K
+
i ) = Π(Ki) + φ(Ki), we can deduce that, due
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to the continuity of J(.) and H(.), her utility will jump upwards, implying that Ki is
not an optimum. This proves by contradiction that Π∗(.) is continuous.
Next step shows that if the support of Π∗(.), denoted by S∗, contain two intervals
[A,B] and [C,D] with D > C > B > A ≥ 0, then it also contains the interval [B,C].
Suppose S∗ does not contain [B,C]. We then have Π∗(k) < Π∗(B) for A < k < B,
Π∗(k) = Π∗(B) for B ≤ k ≤ C and, Π∗(k) > Π∗(C) = Π∗(B) for C < k < D.
For all k in the support, U(k) = U∗. This implies that U(B) = U(C) = U∗. As
Π∗(k) = Π∗(C) = Π∗(B) for all k in [B,C], we also have J(B) = J(C) = J(k) in
the interval [B,C]. Since H(.) is strictly concave, U(k) = −k + J(B)H(k) is strictly
concave. Consequently, U(k) > U(B) = U∗ for all k in ]B,C[. This contradiction
proves that the support of Π∗(.) is an interval [A,B] such that 0 ≤ A < B ≤ ∞.
We can now show that the support of Π∗(.) is bounded above. Suppose it is not.
Consequently, this support is an interval [A,∞[ with A ≥ 0. For all k > 0, U(k) ≤
V (k). It results that U(k) tends to −∞ when k tends to +∞. As U(0) > 0, this is a
contradiction which sets that S∗ is bounded above.
In other words, S∗ is an interval [A,B] with 0 ≤ A < B <∞.
B. Isomorphism between the distribution model Π(k)
and the ranking model k(r)
If Π(.) is continuous and strictly increasing - like KUJ equilibrium Π∗(.) - the mapping
between the ranking model, k(r), and the distribution model, Π(k), is a simple change
in variables. This appendix shows how this mapping extends to piecewise continuous
non-decreasing functions.
Namely, we show that any piecewise continuous c.d.f., Π(k) translates into a piecewise
continuous non-decreasing “ranking function” k(r).
Let us first consider an interval [k1, k2] on which Π(k) is strictly increasing. On this
interval Π(.) has a reciprocal k(r) = Π−1(r). For all r in [r1 = Π(k1), r2 = Π(k2)], the
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share of individuals whose ranks are lower than r is Prob[Rank < r] = Prob[Effort
< Π−1(r)] = Π(Π−1(r)) = r.
Let us now consider the case of a mass point, K, of Π(.) such that Π(K+) = Π(K) +
Φ(K), with 0 < Φ(K) ≤ 1. Remember that, according to our definition, Π(K) =
Prob[Effort < K].
One can see that in this case, k(r) is a constant equal to K for all r in the interval
[r3 = Π(K), r4 = Π(K) + Φ(K)].
In this interval, the KUJ multiplier, J(Π(k(r))), is constant and equal to J(r3). This
implies that
Σ([k(.)]r4r3) =
∫ r4
r3
[−k(r) + J(r3)H(k(r))]dr = Φ(K)[−K + J(Π(K))H(K)]
Finally, we have to deal with holes in the support of Π(k).
Suppose Π(.) is constant in an interval [k5, k6] while increasing in the left hand neigh-
borhood of k5 as well as in the right hand neighborhood of k6. One can see that the
rank associated with this interval is R = Π(k5) = Π(k6). In addition, k(R) = k5 and
k(R+) = k6. In words, the ranking function k(.) is discontinuous at R and jumps
upwards.
C. Social optimum
Due to the isomorphism between Π(.) and k(.), the social optimum can be defined as
a ranking function kS(r) on [0, 1] which maximizes
Σ(k(.)) =
∫ 1
0
[−k(r) + J(r)H(k(r))]dr
It follows that, assuming that −1 + µH ′(0) > 0, as in Proposition 1, kS(r) is deter-
mined by −1 + J(r)[dH(k(r))/dk(r)] = 0 for all r in [0, 1].
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Since H(.) is strictly concave and J(.) is strictly increasing, kS(r) is strictly increasing.
Consequently, the case in which the social optimum kS(r) would be constant on a
subinterval of [0, 1] is clearly excluded. Indeed, since J(r) is strictly increasing, the
maximum of
∫ r4
r3
[−k(r) + J(r)H(k(r))]dr with respect to [k(r)]r4r3 is higher than the
maximum of (r4 − r3)[−K + J(r3)H(K)] with respect to K. In words, assuming
that k(r) is constant on an interval [r3, r4] with (0 ≤ r3 < r4 ≤ 1) would generate
a constraint on the planner’s problem. The same holds for a discontinuity of k(r).
Since kS(r) is strictly increasing, the optimal distribution, ΠS(k) is the reciprocal
of kS(r). This implies that ΠS(k) is strictly increasing in its (connected) support
[AS = kS(0), BS = kS(1)]. Mass points and holes in the support of ΠS(k) are not
compatible with optimality.
D. Impact of labor efficiency on perceived wealth
Let us prove that an increase in labor efficiency, b, improves “perceived” wealth,
measured by gross incomes. For any production function such that H(k, b) = H(bk),
we obtain dH−1(y)/db = −k/b. On the other hand, due to the envelope theorem,
∂U∗/∂b = exp (−λ)H ′[(A∗b)]A∗. This means that true wealth (utilities) is enhanced.
Since exp (−λ)H ′[(A∗b)] = 1/b, it results that the derivative of G(y) with respect
to b has the same sign as A∗ − k, which difference is (strictly) negative for all y
in the interval ]H(A∗), H(B∗)]. In words, for almost all y in the support of G(.)
, the share of individuals whose incomes are lower than y decreases. According to
the criterion of stochastic dominance, parameter b increases (perceived) wealth, i.e.,
reduces (perceived) poverty.
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